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Wither Zauderer, Blossom Heightened 
Scrutiny? How the Supreme Court’s 
2018 Rulings in Becerra and Janus 




This Article examines how the United States Supreme Court’s 
2018 decisions in the First Amendment cases of National Institute 
of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra and Janus v. American 
Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees, Council 31, 
muddle an already disorderly compelled-speech doctrine. 
Specifically, dual five-to-four decisions in Becerra and Janus 
raise key questions about the level of scrutiny—either a heightened 
test or a deferential variant of rational basis review—against 
which statutes compelling expression should be measured. 
Critically, Becerra illustrates the willingness of the Court’s 
conservative Justices to narrowly confine the aging 
compelled-speech test from Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel. Furthermore, the Article explores how Justice Clarence 
Thomas’s concurrence in a third 2018 decision—Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission—heightens 
problems with the compelled-speech doctrine. The Article 
concludes by proposing multiple criteria for the Court to consider 
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when determining the level of scrutiny to use in compelled-speech 
cases. 
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I. Introduction 
The unenumerated First Amendment1 right not to speak,2 
sometimes called “the First Amendment freedom from compelled 
expression,”3 once was readily understood. Viewed by the United 
 
 1. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in pertinent 
part, that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or 
of the press . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press 
Clauses were incorporated nearly ninety-five years ago through the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause as fundamental liberties to apply to state and 
local government entities and officials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 
666 (1925) (“[W]e may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press 
are among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”). 
 2. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245 (2002) (“As a 
general principle, the First Amendment bars the government from dictating 
what we see or read or speak or hear.” (emphasis added)), superseded on other 
grounds by statute, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003); see also Wooley v. 
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (“The right to speak and the right to refrain 
from speaking are complementary . . . .”). 
 3. Howard M. Wasserman, Compelled Expression and the Public Forum 
Doctrine, 77 TUL. L. REV. 163, 168 (2002). 
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States Supreme Court “as part and parcel of the freedom of 
speech,”4 it was rooted in a handful of cases.5 Each was factually 
different, but generally extended “robust protection for a right not 
to speak.”6  
For example, in 1943 the Supreme Court concluded in West 
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette7 that public school 
students cannot be forced to pledge allegiance to the United 
States and to engage in the symbolic expression8 of saluting the 
American flag.9 Justice Robert Jackson famously explained in 
Barnette that “[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional 
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe 
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other 
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their 
faith therein.”10 This precept, Professor Joseph Blocher notes, is 
now “a pillar of First Amendment jurisprudence . . . despite the 
fact that the amendment’s text says nothing specifically about a 
right or freedom not to speak.”11 
Later, in its 1977 ruling in Wooley v. Maynard,12 the Court 
made it clear that a state cannot compel individuals to display 
mottos on government-required license plates that are 
 
 4. Scott W. Gaylord & Thomas J. Molony, Casey and a Woman’s Right to 
Know: Ultrasounds, Informed Consent, and the First Amendment, 45 CONN. L. 
REV. 595, 618 (2012). 
 5. See cases cited infra notes 7–19 (analyzing the Supreme Court’s early 
First Amendment jurisprudence). 
 6. Abner S. Greene, “Not in My Name” Claims of Constitutional Right, 98 
B.U. L. REV. 1475, 1486 (2018). 
 7. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 8. See id. at 632 
There is no doubt that, in connection with the pledges, the flag salute 
is a form of utterance. Symbolism is a primitive but effective way of 
communicating ideas. The use of an emblem or flag to symbolize some 
system, idea, institution, or personality, is a short cut from mind to 
mind. 
 9. See id. at 642 (“We think the action of the local authorities in 
compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on 
their power and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose 
of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control.”). 
 10. Id.  
 11. Joseph Blocher, The Right Not to Keep or Bear Arms, 64 STAN. L. REV. 
1, 19 (2012). 
 12. 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
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“repugnant to their moral and religious beliefs.”13 The Court 
ruled in favor of a husband and wife who were Jehovah’s 
Witnesses and who objected on “moral, religious, and political” 
grounds to conveying New Hampshire’s state motto of “Live Free 
or Die” on their automobile’s license plate.14 In brief, as Professor 
Mark Strasser writes, “Barnette and Wooley both stand for the 
proposition that the First Amendment protects the right not to 
speak under certain conditions . . . .”15 
Additionally, the Court in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. 
Tornillo16 specified forty-five years ago that newspapers are not 
obligated to print editorial content to which they object.17 
Furthermore, in its 1995 ruling in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, 
Lesbian & Bisexual Group,18 the Court held that private citizens 
who organize parades cannot be required by the government to 
 
 13. Id. at 707. 
 14. See id. at 707 n.2 (describing Mr. Maynard’s objections to the state 
motto: “I believe that life is more precious than freedom”). 
 15. Mark A. Strasser, What’s Fair for Conscientious Objectors Subject to 
Public Accommodations Laws, 48 N.M. L. REV. 124, 134 (2018). Strasser points 
out, however, that both Barnette and Wooley 
involved government-prescribed speech, so their applicability in 
contexts where the government is not specifying contents of others’ 
speech is an open question. It is simply unclear whether an important 
aspect of the right not to speak jurisprudence is that an individual is 
being asked to expressly affirm something contrary to his or her 
belief.  
Id. at 134–35. 
 16. 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
 17. In striking down a Florida right-of-reply statute that granted political 
candidates free space in newspapers in the Sunshine State that had criticized or 
attacked their records, the Court reasoned: 
A newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or conduit for news, 
comment, and advertising. The choice of material to go into a 
newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the size and 
content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public 
officials—whether fair or unfair—constitute the exercise of editorial 
control and judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how 
governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised 
consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they 
have evolved to this time. 
Id. at 258. 
 18. 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
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include in them “a group imparting a message the organizers do 
not wish to convey.”19 
Such cases individually are somewhat simple to understand. 
Yet as Professor Nat Stern contended in 2011, “the right to resist 
governmentally imposed expressive activities has evolved into a 
sprawling and ungainly doctrine.”20 That is largely because the 
right not to speak has been “[i]nvoked in efforts to thwart 
requirements ranging from acceptance of military recruiters at 
law school campuses to subsidies for generic advertising of 
agricultural products . . . .”21 If it was true eight years ago that 
the right not to speak had “lost much of its coherence,”22 then 
facets of three 2018 Supreme Court rulings—National Institute of 
Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra,23 Janus v. American 
Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees, Council 
31,24 and Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission25—further clouded the murky waters.  
In Becerra, a conservative five-Justice majority26 held that 
two compelled-speech obligations affecting religiously affiliated 
anti-abortion crisis pregnancy centers27 in California likely 
violated the First Amendment.28 One provision mandated that 
 
 19. Id. at 559. 
 20. Nat Stern, The Subordinate Status of Negative Speech Rights, 59 BUFF. 
L. REV. 847, 849 (2011). 
 21. Id.  
 22. Id.  
 23. 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 24. 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). 
 25. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
 26. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the majority opinion and was joined 
by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Anthony Kennedy, Samuel Alito, 
and Neil Gorsuch. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2367 (identifying the Justices who 
joined Thomas in delivering the Court’s opinion). 
 27. See Adam Liptak, Anti-Abortion Health Clinics Win First Amendment 
Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2018, at A1 (describing the centers as “religiously 
oriented” facilities that “oppose abortion on religious grounds”); see also Adam 
Liptak, Skepticism by the Court for a Law that Requires a Discussion of 
Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2018, at A13 (“The centers, which are often 
affiliated with religious groups, seek to persuade women to carry their 
pregnancies to term or to offer their offspring for adoption.”). 
 28. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2378 (“We hold that petitioners are likely to 
succeed on the merits of their claim that the FACT Act violates the First 
Amendment.”). 
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licensed crisis pregnancy centers29 notify women that California 
offers free and low-cost abortion services.30 The other required 
unlicensed centers31 to post the following message: “This facility 
is not licensed as a medical facility by the State of California and 
has no licensed medical provider who provides or directly 
supervises the provision of services.”32 Justice Stephen Breyer, 
joined by fellow liberal-leaning Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan, dissented and declared both 
provisions “likely constitutional.”33 
In Janus, the same five-Justice majority that aligned in 
Becerra declared unconstitutional an Illinois statute34 compelling 
public employees who are not union members to pay an agency 
fee to the union that exclusively bargains on their behalf.35 
Penning the majority opinion in Janus, Justice Samuel Alito 
wrote that “this arrangement violates the free speech rights of 
nonmembers by compelling them to subsidize private speech on 
matters of substantial public concern.”36 In reaching this 
conclusion—and of particular importance to this Article—Alito 
opined that “measures compelling speech are at least as 
threatening”37 as those squelching speech and, in fact, may cause 
“additional damage.”38 Writing for the same bloc of dissenters as 
 
 29. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123471(a) (West 2016) (setting forth 
the criteria for a licensed center). 
 30. Id. § 123472(a)(1). 
 31. See id. § 123471(b) (setting forth the criteria for an unlicensed center). 
 32. Id. § 123472(b)(1). 
 33. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2379–80 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
because “most human behavior takes place through speech” and because much 
of the law regulates that speech in terms of its content, the majority’s approach 
“at least threatens considerable litigation over the constitutional validity of 
much, perhaps most, government regulation”). 
 34. See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/6(e) (2018) (providing that agency fees are 
chargeable to non-union members for union activities including “the costs of the 
collective bargaining process, contract administration and pursuing matters 
affecting wages, hours and conditions of employment”). 
 35. Janus v. Am. Fed’n State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 
2448, 2460 (2018). 
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. at 2464. 
 38. See id. (explaining that when speech is compelled, individuals “are 
coerced into betraying their convictions” and are demeaned by being forced to 
endorse ideas that they find objectionable). 
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in Becerra, Justice Kagan blasted the majority both for “turning 
the First Amendment into a sword, and using it against 
workaday economic and regulatory policy”39 and for broadly 
contending “that compelling speech always works a greater 
injury, and so always requires a greater justification.”40 
Finally, the Court in Masterpiece Cakeshop held that the 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission violated the First 
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause41 rights of a baker because it 
failed to act with “religious neutrality” in punishing him for 
violating a state anti-discrimination statute.42 The baker, Jack 
Phillips, was “a devout Christian” who refused to create a cake 
celebrating the marriage of a same-sex couple “because of his 
religious opposition to same-sex marriage.”43 
Although Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opinion for the Court 
dodged the First Amendment free speech issue, Justice Clarence 
Thomas issued a concurrence addressing it.44 Thomas initially 
concluded that making a custom wedding cake constitutes 
expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment.45 He then 
found that being forced to produce such a cake for a same-sex 
wedding under Colorado’s anti-discrimination statute amounted 
to a compelled-speech obligation that would violate the First 
 
 39. Id. at 2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 40. Id. at 2494. 
 41. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in pertinent 
part, that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free 
Exercise Clause was incorporated nearly eighty years ago through the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause as a fundamental liberty to apply 
to state and local government entities and officials. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 
310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment embraces 
First Amendment liberties).  
 42. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. 
Ct. 1719, 1724, 1731 (2018) (concluding that “the Commission’s treatment of 
Phillips’ case violated the State’s duty under the First Amendment not to base 
laws or regulations on hostility to a religion or religious viewpoint”). 
 43. Id.  
 44.  See id. at 1740 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“While Phillips rightly 
prevails on his free-exercise claim, I write separately to address his free-speech 
claim.”). 
 45. See id. at 1743–44 (explaining that a wedding cake symbolizes the 
celebration of a new marriage and, thus, communicates a message).  
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Amendment’s protection of free speech unless it could survive the 
strict scrutiny standard of review.46  
How Becerra, Janus, and Masterpiece Cakeshop affect the 
First Amendment right not to speak is the focus of this Article as 
well as the decisions’ impact on the Court’s 1985 ruling in 
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel.47 The Court in 
Zauderer considered whether the government can lawfully 
“prevent potential deception of the public by requiring attorneys 
to disclose in their advertising certain information regarding fee 
arrangements.”48 Specifically, Ohio compelled attorneys using 
contingency fee arrangements to disclose to clients that they may 
need to pay litigation costs if they lose their cases.49 The Court 
emphasized that Ohio compelled only “purely factual and 
uncontroversial information about the terms under which [an 
attorney’s] services will be available.”50  
In upholding this requirement, the Court distinguished the 
above-noted cases of Barnette, Wooley, and Tornillo.51 In 
particular, that trio of decisions did not involve commercial 
speech, which is protected by the First Amendment primarily 
because of its “value to consumers.”52 The Court in Zauderer thus 
held “that an advertiser’s rights are adequately protected as long 
as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State’s 
interest in preventing deception of consumers.”53 The Court 
added that while such disclosure requirements cannot be “unduly 
burdensome,”54 they need not be the least restrictive means of 
 
 46. See id. at 1745–46 (“Because Phillips’ conduct . . . was expressive, 
Colorado’s public-accommodations law cannot penalize [the conduct] unless the 
law withstands strict scrutiny.”); see also infra note 59 and accompanying text 
(describing strict scrutiny). 
 47. 471 U.S. 626 (1985). 
 48. Id. at 629. 
 49. See id. at 633 (“DR 2–101(B)(15) . . . provides that any advertisement 
that mentions contingent-fee rates must ‘disclose whether percentages are 
computed before or after deduction of court costs and expenses . . . .’”). 
 50. Id. at 651. 
 51. See id. (“[T]he interests at stake in this case are not of the same order 
as those discussed in Wooley, Tornillo, and Barnette.”). 
 52. See id. (discussing the consumer-focused considerations surrounding 
First Amendment protection of commercial speech).    
 53. Id.  
 54. Id.  
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serving the state’s interest in preventing deception.55 
Additionally, the government need not worry about an 
underinclusivity challenge.56 
The Zauderer standard approximates a lenient, rational 
basis test57 rather than a heightened level of judicial review—like 
intermediate scrutiny58 or strict scrutiny59—even though the 
 
 55. See id. at 651 n.14 (“We reject appellant’s contention that we should 
subject disclosure requirements to a strict ‘least restrictive means’ analysis 
under which they must be struck down if there are other means by which the 
State’s purposes may be served.”). 
 56. Here, the Court wrote: 
[W]e are unpersuaded by appellant’s argument that a disclosure 
requirement is subject to attack if it is “under-inclusive”—that is, if it 
does not get at all facets of the problem it is designed to ameliorate. 
As a general matter, governments are entitled to attack problems 
piecemeal, save where their policies implicate rights so fundamental 
that strict scrutiny must be applied. 
Id.; see generally Clay Calvert, Underinclusivity and the First Amendment: The 
Legislative Right to Nibble at Problems After Williams-Yulee, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
525 (2016) (providing a comprehensive review of the underinclusivity doctrine). 
 57. See Lili Levi, A “Faustian Pact”? Native Advertising and the Future of 
the Press, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 647, 681 (2015) (opining that the test in Zauderer is 
“akin to rational basis review”); see also Katie R. Eyer, The Canon of Rational 
Basis Review, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1317, 1319 (2018) (asserting that “the 
canonical account of rational basis review is a bleak one for those challenging 
the constitutionality of government action: a doctrine which is extraordinarily 
deferential and will virtually never result in government action being 
overturned”); Brandon L. Garrett, Constitutional Reasonableness, 102 MINN. L. 
REV. 61, 64 (2017) (observing that “rational basis review ostensibly asks judges 
to deferentially review reasonable government decisions”); Cynthia Lee, Package 
Bombs, Footlockers, and Laptops: What the Disappearing Container Doctrine 
Can Tell Us About the Fourth Amendment, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1403, 
1467 (2010) (suggesting that “courts engaging in equal protection rational basis 
review will invalidate social and economic legislation only if there is absolutely 
no rational explanation, real or imagined, for the legislation”); Stacey L. Sobel, 
The Tsunami of Legal Uncertainty: What’s a Court to Do Post-McDonald?, 21 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 489, 495 (2012) (“The lowest level of review is the 
rational basis test—a highly deferential form of scrutiny. In order for a 
regulation to survive rational basis review, the challenger must prove that the 
regulation does not bear a ‘rational relationship’ to a ‘legitimate governmental 
purpose.’”). 
 58. Content-neutral regulations of speech typically are subject to 
intermediate scrutiny. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 
(2017) (explaining that in order to survive intermediate scrutiny, North 
Carolina’s content-neutral statute prohibiting sex offenders from accessing 
social networking sites “must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
governmental interest”). Under intermediate scrutiny, a statute “need not be the 
least restrictive or least intrusive means of” serving the alleged government 
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Zauderer Court did not use rational basis terminology.60 In brief, 
while a version of intermediate scrutiny typically applies in 
commercial speech cases where the government suppresses 
speech,61 an even more lax standard from Zauderer applies when 
 
interest in order to satisfy the “narrowly tailored” prong. Ward v. Rock Against 
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989). 
 59. Strict scrutiny “applies either when a law is content based on its face or 
when the purpose and justification for the law are content based.” Reed v. Town 
of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2228 (2015). Under this standard, laws are “justified 
only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve 
compelling state interests.” Id. at 2226. Narrow tailoring under strict scrutiny, 
in turn, requires a statute to “be the least restrictive means” of serving the 
government’s allegedly compelling interest. McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 
478 (2014). See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011) 
(observing that a statute that restricts “the content of protected speech” will 
pass strict scrutiny only if “it is justified by a compelling government interest 
and is narrowly drawn to serve that interest”). 
 60. Former Yale Law School Dean Robert Post explains that 
[b]ecause commercial speakers retain “minimal” First Amendment 
interests, Zauderer does not employ the specific vocabulary of 
“rational basis” review, which would have suggested extreme judicial 
deference. It instead adopts terminology that unequivocally locates 
judicial review further toward the deferential end of the spectrum 
than the intermediate scrutiny authorized by Central Hudson. 
Robert Post, C. Edwin Baker Lecture for Liberty, Equality, and Democracy: 
Compelled Commercial Speech, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 867, 883 (2015). 
 61. The U.S. Supreme Court typically deploys a four-part test for 
commercial speech that requires courts to 
determine whether the expression is protected by the First 
Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it 
at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, 
[courts] ask whether the asserted governmental interest is 
substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, [courts] must 
determine whether the regulation directly advances the 
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive 
than is necessary to serve that interest. 
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980); 
see also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 572 (2001) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (describing “the intermediate scrutiny of Central Hudson”); see also 
Levi, supra note 57, at 681 n.172 (discussing how Central Hudson created “a 
four-pronged standard of intermediate scrutiny for commercial speech” 
(emphasis added)); Tamara R. Piety, Market Failure in the Marketplace of Ideas: 
Commercial Speech and the Problem that Won’t Go Away, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
181, 182 (2007) (observing that “the commercial speech doctrine creates a 
category of speech subject to intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment” 
(emphasis added)). 
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it compels advertisers to disclose factual and noncontroversial 
information.62 
With this background in mind, Part II of the Article 
examines both Becerra and Janus and how they affect the Court’s 
compelled-speech jurisprudence and, more specifically, the level 
of scrutiny that applies to evaluate the constitutionality of 
compelled-speech mandates. Part II also explores crucial points of 
disagreement between the majority and dissent in Becerra over 
the scope of the Court’s decades-old ruling in Zauderer. Part III 
then turns in greater detail to Justice Thomas’s concurrence in 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, in which he elaborated on his views 
regarding compelled speech. Thomas’s Masterpiece Cakeshop 
opinion merits separate analysis here because he penned the 
majority opinion just three weeks later in Becerra, which struck 
down a pair of compelled-speech obligations.63 Finally, Part IV 
concludes by proposing criteria for the Court to use when 
deciding the proper level of scrutiny in compelled-speech cases. 
Regardless of whether the Court adopts these variables, it is 
imperative for it to better articulate and then consistently apply 
its own standards for determining scrutiny in compelled-speech 
disputes. This would add predictability to this now jumbled niche 
of First Amendment jurisprudence and, in the process, enhance 
the Court’s legitimacy that arguably is eroded when it fractures 
along perceived political lines in compelled-speech cases such as 
Becerra and Janus. 
II. Compelled Speech and the Chasm Dividing the Justices: 
Examining Becerra and Janus and Their Impact on Zauderer 
This Part of the Article has two sections. Section A explores 
the Supreme Court’s analysis of a compelled-speech obligation in 
National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra and how 
the majority and dissent disagreed about the applicable level of 
 
 62. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) 
(stating that an advertiser’s “constitutionally protected interest in not providing 
any particular factual information in his advertising is minimal”). 
 63. Compare Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 
S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (case decided on June 4, 2018), with Nat’l Inst. of Family & 
Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) (case decided on June 26, 
2018). 
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scrutiny. Section B then assesses the Court’s discussion of 
compelled speech in Janus v. American Federation of State, 
County, & Municipal Employees and the similar clash over 
scrutiny in Janus. 
A. National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra 
As noted above, Becerra concerned the constitutionality of a 
California law compelling speech at both licensed and unlicensed 
crisis pregnancy centers.64 For simplicity’s sake, this section 
focuses on the obligation at licensed centers to inform women 
that “California has public programs that provide immediate free 
or low-cost access to comprehensive family planning services 
(including all FDA-approved methods of contraception), prenatal 
care, and abortion for eligible women.”65 This message had to be 
conveyed either by being posted in a conspicuous place in a 
facility’s waiting room or by being given individually in print or 
digital form to all clients.66 
California enacted this measure—called the FACT Act—to 
educate women about “their rights and the health care services 
available to them.”67 The compelled-speech obligation was 
essential because, according to the state, “thousands of women” 
are unaware of public programs relating to abortion services.68 
Additionally, the state contended that delivery of the message 
about abortion services at crisis facilities was critical because of 
the “time sensitive nature of pregnancy-related decisions.”69 
In short, California’s rationale taps into what Professor Burt 
Neuborne calls “a hearer’s First Amendment right to know”70 
about “information and ideas that will assist the hearer in 
 
 64. See supra notes 26–33 and accompanying text (providing an overview of 
the laws at issue in Becerra, as well as the Court’s decision in the case). 
 65. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123472 (a)(1) (West 2016). 
 66. See id. § 123472 (a)(2)(A)–(C) (listing the three ways through which the 
information may be distributed). 
 67. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2369. 
 68. See id. (describing the state legislature’s motivation in enacting the 
measure). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Burt Neuborne, The Status of the Hearer in Mr. Madison’s 
Neighborhood, 25 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 897, 906 (2017). 
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making rational, informed choices, whether economic, social, 
aesthetic, or political.”71 Although the Supreme Court has 
acknowledged in dicta the existence of a First Amendment right 
to receive speech,72 Neuborne notes that the Court generally “has 
not . . . developed the right to know beyond the slogan stage.”73  
Before delving into Becerra’s majority and dissenting 
opinions, it is useful to pinpoint precisely what California’s law 
did and did not do. Specifically, the compelled-speech mandate for 
licensed centers might be considered a pure 
disclosure-of-factual-information obligation.74 Unlike the seminal 
right-not-to-speak cases of Barnette and Wooley, California did 
not compel the centers to express a viewpoint, adopt a position, or 
convey a state-sponsored philosophy, maxim, or creed.75 
Additionally, and in contrast with Tornillo, in which Florida 
required newspapers in the Sunshine State to print the views of 
political candidates who those newspapers criticized or 
attacked,76 licensed centers were not forced to publish noxious 
political views or positions.77 California’s law thus was not what 
might be characterized as an expression-of-viewpoint 
compelled-speech obligation.78 
 
 71. Id. at 906–07.  
 72. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (asserting that 
the “freedom of speech and press includes,” among other things, “the right to 
receive” speech); see also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Comm’n, 475 U.S. 
1, 8 (1986) (“By protecting those who wish to enter the marketplace of ideas 
from government attack, the First Amendment protects the public’s interest in 
receiving information.”). 
 73. Neuborne, supra note 70, at 907.  
 74. See supra notes 47–56 and accompanying text (distinguishing 
Zauderer’s commercial speech conveying factual information from other forms of 
compelled speech). 
 75. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 
2368–70 (2018) (describing the law’s factual, information-based disclosure 
requirements). 
 76. See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 243 (1974) (“The 
issue in this case is whether a state statute granting a political candidate a 
right to equal space to reply to criticism and attacks on his record by a 
newspaper violates the guarantees of a free press.”). 
 77. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2371 (characterizing the notice’s content as 
“the availability of state-sponsored services, as well as contact information for 
how to obtain them”).  
 78. Compare id., with Janus v. Am. Fed’n State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., 138 
S. Ct. 2448, 2459–60 (2018) (explaining that mandatory labor union fees are 
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Additionally, California’s law targeting licensed centers was 
not what might be dubbed a prevention-of-deception 
compelled-speech obligation.79 It was not, in other words, 
designed to correct information conveyed at licensed centers that 
might be false or misleading. Rather, as California lawmakers 
put it, the measure was intended to “ensure that California 
residents make their personal reproductive health care 
decisions knowing their rights and the health care services 
available to them.”80 The obligation thus might—positively  
put—be called a knowledge-enhancement compelled-speech 
mandate or—negatively parsed—a correction-of-ignorance duty.81 
One might query whether a state has a greater interest in 
compelling speech to prevent deception or to enhance knowledge 
or, alternatively, whether compelling speech in the name of those 
two interests is of equal importance when evaluating the 
constitutionality of a compelled-speech statute. 
Furthermore, California’s law might also be classified as a 
message-diluting or message-adulterating compelled-speech 
obligation.82 That is because, by being forced to convey facts about 
a procedure to which the speaker (i.e., a licensed crisis pregnancy 
center) objects and, in turn, to convey facts that might (because 
they specify that abortion services are offered free and at 
low-cost) lead a patient to adopt that procedure, the power of the 
speaker’s own message in favor of not terminating pregnancy is 
arguably diminished.83 Put differently, a licensed crisis 
pregnancy center with an anti-abortion stance might find that its 
message’s influence is mitigated (or at least contaminated) by 
 
viewpoint-based compelled speech). 
 79. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 
(1985) (recognizing the state’s legitimate interest in “preventing deception of 
consumers”). 
 80. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2369. 
 81. See Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 611 
(1935) (“The state may . . . afford protection against ignorance, incapacity, and 
imposition.”); see also In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 202 (1982) (recognizing the 
state’s interest in controlling advertising for professional services due to “the 
public’s comparative lack of knowledge”). 
 82. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2371 (discussing the effect of content-based 
speech regulations that undermine the speaker’s message).  
 83. See id. (describing that a mandatory notice promoting state-subsidized 
abortions “alters the content” of the clinic’s anti-abortion speech). 
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transmitting a fact suggesting that one’s financial status imposes 
no barrier to obtaining an abortion.84 
This Article returns in the Conclusion to some of the 
italicized labels used immediately above for characterizing 
compelled-speech laws. Specifically, the labels are melded into 
the criteria the Conclusion proposes for courts to use when 
deciding the proper level of scrutiny in compelled-speech cases.85 
Indeed, a vital issue—and a point of dispute between the majority 
and dissent—in Becerra was the standard of scrutiny the Court 
should apply to the compelled-speech obligation imposed on 
licensed crisis pregnancy centers.86  
In an opinion written by Justice Clarence Thomas, the 
majority concluded that because the measure was 
content-based,87 strict scrutiny88 should apply unless the case 
either fit within the confines of Zauderer89 or involved the 
regulation “of professional conduct that incidentally burden[ed] 
speech.”90 The majority not only determined that neither 
exception applied,91 but also found that the law could not pass 
muster even under intermediate scrutiny because it was not 
narrowly tailored to serve what the majority assumed was a 
substantial interest in “providing low-income women with 
information about state-sponsored services.”92 
 
 84. See id. (acknowledging the conflict between providing information for 
abortion services while simultaneously trying to “dissuade women from choosing 
that option”). 
 85. See discussion infra Part IV (taking a holistic approach and 
articulating multiple variables for considering the proper level of scrutiny in 
compelled-speech cases). 
 86. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 
2382–83 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority’s decision 
to apply a heightened standard of scrutiny). 
 87. See id. at 2365 (majority opinion) (reasoning that the notices were 
content-based regulations because they compelled petitioners to speak a 
particular message, thus “alter[ing] the content of their speech”). 
 88. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (describing strict scrutiny). 
 89. See supra notes 47–62 and accompanying text (describing Zauderer and 
the test the Court fashioned in it). 
 90. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2373. 
 91. See id. at 2372–73 (describing each exception and concluding that 
neither applied). 
 92.  Id.  
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In rejecting application of the Zauderer test, the majority 
limited that test to situations in which the compelled speech 
relates to services provided by the regulated entity or 
individual.93 Because crisis pregnancy centers do not offer 
abortions, Zauderer did not apply.94 
Moreover, the majority reasoned that Zauderer only concerns 
situations involving compelled speech about uncontroversial 
topics.95 Thomas opined that abortion is “anything but an 
‘uncontroversial’ topic.”96 This, however, cleverly contorts 
Zauderer’s actual language. Zauderer mentioned “uncontroversial 
information,”97 not an uncontroversial topic. Additionally, and 
problematically, what constitutes a “controversial” topic is 
subjective, and Thomas offered no guidance for how it might be 
established.98 
The majority also rejected the argument that California’s law 
primarily regulated professional conduct and only incidentally 
burdened speech.99 Becerra was not, Justice Thomas reasoned, an 
informed-consent case in which the government mandated speech 
incidental to a procedure performed by a professional.100 In other 
words, because licensed crisis pregnancy centers do not 
themselves perform abortions, the speech California required was 
 
 93. See id. at 2372 (“The notice in no way relates to the services that 
licensed clinics provide. Instead, it requires these clinics to disclose information 
about state-sponsored services—including abortion . . . .”).  
 94. See id. (acknowledging that abortion is one such service that the 
licensed clinics do not provide and clarifying that Zauderer applies only in the 
context of professionals advertising their own services). 
 95. See id. (explaining that the disclosures in Zauderer were upheld 
because they contained “purely factual and uncontroversial information”).  
 96. Id.  
 97. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) 
(emphasis added).  
 98. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 
(2018) (opining that abortion is “anything but” an uncontroversial topic without 
justifying his assertion). 
 99. See id. at 2373–74 (concluding that the licensed notice does not regulate 
professional conduct because it applies to “all interactions between a covered 
facility and its clients, regardless of whether a medical procedure is ever sought, 
offered, or performed”). 
 100. See id. (suggesting that Becerra falls short of the line “long familiar to 
the bar” between conduct and speech—only the former of which can be heavily 
regulated). 
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untethered from any conduct.101 Thomas therefore concluded that 
instead of being incidental to conduct, the “licensed notice 
regulates speech as speech” and requires heightened scrutiny.102 
The majority in Becerra, however, suggested two other 
circumstances when compelled-speech requirements are 
permissible, including when the message: 1) consists “of health 
and safety warnings long considered permissible,”103 or 2) 
involves “purely factual and uncontroversial disclosures about 
commercial products.”104 Regarding the former circumstance, the 
majority failed to clarify for precisely how long a health and 
safety warning must have both existed and been considered 
permissible before it falls within this exception.105 Additionally, 
Thomas did not articulate when a warning implicates “health and 
safety” concerns.106 As for the latter exception, it seemingly 
extends Zauderer from the realm of services offered by attorneys 
and doctors to the domain of products sold commercially.107 
In summary, the Becerra majority held that content-based, 
compelled-speech regulations must surmount heightened scrutiny 
unless one of four exceptions applies.108 Those exceptions arise 
when the compelled speech:  
 
 101. See id. at 2373 (“The notice does not facilitate informed consent to a 
medical procedure. In fact, it is not tied to a procedure at all.”). 
 102. See id. at 2372–74 (stating that “neither line of precedents” applying to 
“purely factual and uncontroversial information” or to notices that 
“regulat[e] . . . professional conduct” would lessen the standard of scrutiny in 
this case). 
 103. Id. at 2376. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See id. at 2381 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The majority . . . does not 
explain why the [FACT] Act here, which is justified in part by health and safety 
considerations, does not fall within its ‘health’ category.”).  
 106. See id. at 2376 (majority opinion) (stating the legality of “health and 
safety warnings” without defining a standard to determine whether a disclosure 
falls into that category). 
 107. Compare Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 561–62, 655 (upholding the State of 
Ohio’s requirement that an attorney offering services on a contingent fee basis 
disclose that clients would have to pay costs even in an unsuccessful lawsuit), 
with Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2376 (indicating that “purely factual and 
uncontroversial disclosures about commercial products” fall under the Zauderer 
exception for compelled speech (emphasis added)). 
 108. See cases cited infra notes 109–112 and accompanying text 
(summarizing the exceptions to the heightened scrutiny standard for compelled 
speech designated by the Becerra majority).   
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1) is purely factual, pertains to services rendered directly by 
the regulated entity or individual, and relates to an 
uncontroversial topic;109 or 
2) is merely incidental to conduct (a procedure) performed by a 
professional;110 or 
3) consists of warnings affecting health and safety, and those 
warnings have been considered permissible for a long period of 
time;111 or  
4) relates to commercial products and conveys factual and 
uncontroversial information about them.112 
Of particular importance from a free-speech theory 
perspective, the majority invoked the venerable marketplace of 
ideas metaphor113 to illustrate the supposed danger of California 
imposing its compelled-speech obligation on licensed facilities and 
show why strict scrutiny must apply.114 The marketplace theory, 
in a nutshell, comports with “the idea that freedom of speech 
serves as an effective mechanism for locating truth, for 
identifying and expunging falsity, and for increasing the stock of 
human knowledge.”115 It was instantiated in First Amendment 
 
 109. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 
2372 (2018) (explaining the Becerra majority’s interpretation of when Zauderer 
applies); see also Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (indicating that the constitutional 
protections for a right not to provide uncontroversial factual information are 
minimal). 
 110. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2373 (discussing the “professional conduct” 
exception). 
 111. See id. at 2376 (“[W]e do not question the legality of health and safety 
warnings long considered permissible . . . .”). 
 112. See id. (addressing “uncontroversial disclosures about commercial 
products”). 
 113. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 6 (1992) (“The 
‘marketplace of ideas’ is perhaps the most powerful metaphor in the free speech 
tradition.”); see also Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying 
Privacy Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 998 (2003) (indicating 
the marketplace theory pivots on the belief that free speech “contributes to the 
promotion of truth”). 
 114. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2374–75 (citing the marketplace theory) 
(“[W]hen the government polices the content of professional speech, it can fail ‘to 
preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately 
prevail.’” (quoting McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 476 (2014))). 
 115. Frederick Schauer, Free Speech, the Search for Truth, and the Problem 
of Collective Knowledge, 70 SMU L. REV. 231, 235 (2017). 
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jurisprudence a century ago by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Jr. when he asserted in Abrams v. United States116 that 
when men have realized that time has upset many fighting 
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe 
the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate 
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the 
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself 
accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is 
the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried 
out.117 
In its most simplistic—and perhaps naïve118—formulation, 
the metaphor invokes “the perfect competition of an idealized 
neoclassical free market. Bad ideas should be no more feared 
than bad products or services; they will simply lose out to better 
competitors, so long as all are freely available.”119 If this is the 
case, then an interesting question arises for the metaphor’s 
deployment in Becerra: If California’s mandate that licensed 
centers provide true facts to women about the availability of free 
and low-cost abortions actually expands the speech marketplace 
and helps pregnant women better know their options,120 then how 
did the majority turn the metaphor against the state?   
The answer, it appears, is this: Government intervention in 
the marketplace of ideas compelling professionals to convey facts 
about a procedure they disagree with is simply wrong. That is 
 
 116. 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
 117. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also Thomas W. Joo, The Worst 
Test of Truth: The “Marketplace of Ideas” as Faulty Metaphor, 89 TUL. L. REV. 
383, 385 (2014) (“The metaphor can be traced to Justice Holmes’s dissent in the 
1919 case, Abrams v. United States.”). 
 118. See Lyrissa Lidsky, Nobody’s Fools: The Rational Audience as First 
Amendment Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 799, 826 (2010) (“According to critics, the 
marketplace of ideas cannot function because a few powerful voices drown out 
all others. The resulting lack of diversity in public discourse deprives citizen 
[sic] of the information they need to make rational decisions and denies them 
their right to participate in policy formation.”); see also Smolla, supra note 113, 
at 6 (“The marketplace of ideas, no less than the marketplace of commerce, will 
inevitably be biased in favor of those with the resources to ply their wares.”). 
 119. Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 
821, 829–30 (2008). 
 120. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 
2375 (2018) (stating that California’s interest in requiring the licensed notice 
was “providing low-income women with information about state-sponsored 
services”). 
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because those facts simultaneously dilute the power of the 
professional’s own speech while increasing the odds that patients 
will adopt the disagreed-with procedure that the government 
(literally, through funding) sponsors.121 That, at least, is one way 
to unpack the statement by Justice Thomas in Becerra that 
when the government polices the content of professional 
speech, it can fail to “preserve an uninhibited marketplace of 
ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.” Professionals 
might have a host of good-faith disagreements, both with each 
other and with the government, on many topics in their 
respective fields . . . . “[T]he best test of truth is the power of 
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market,” and the people lose when the government is the one 
deciding which ideas should prevail.122 
A seeming weakness with this logic is that California was not 
“deciding” for either professionals or patients at licensed centers 
whether abortion was a good idea or, to borrow Thomas’s term, 
an idea that “should prevail.”123 Furthermore, California did not 
require any viewpoint on the idea of abortion to be conveyed. 
Instead, it simply compelled transmission of indisputably true 
facts about abortion services.124 Objectively true facts—unlike the 
subjective idea of whether abortion is a good or bad (morally or 
medically) procedure—are not subject for debate in the 
marketplace of ideas.125 The facts simply add truthful information 
to the speech marketplace.  
Indeed, as Justice Stephen Breyer wrote for the four-Justice 
dissent in Becerra, the “marketplace is fostered, not hindered, by 
providing information to patients to enable them to make fully 
 
 121. See id. at 2371 (“By requiring petitioners to inform women how they 
can obtain state-subsidized abortions—at the same time petitioners try to 
dissuade women from choosing that option—the licensed notice plainly ‘alters 
the content’ of petitioners’ speech.”). 
 122. Id. at 2374–75 (internal citations omitted). 
 123. See id. (“[T]he people lose when the government is the one deciding who 
should prevail.”). 
 124. See id. at 2379–80 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE § 123472(a)(1) (West 2018) (showing that California’s required 
disclosure did not require professionals to express a viewpoint regarding 
abortion)). 
 125. See id. at 2388 (expressing Breyer’s view that the marketplace of ideas 
is “fostered, not hindered by providing [factual] information to patients to enable 
them to make fully informed decisions in respect to their pregnancies”). 
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informed medical decisions in respect to their pregnancies.”126 
Pointing out the key distinction between disputable ideas and 
incontestable facts, Breyer added that while “[a]bortion is a 
controversial topic and a source of normative debate,”127 the 
accessibility “of state resources is not a normative statement or a 
fact of debatable truth.”128 
Justice Thomas’s invocation of the marketplace metaphor to 
support the conclusion that strict scrutiny generally applies when 
the government compels professionals to convey content-based 
messages might have been bolstered if he had argued that there 
are at least two distinct idea marketplaces: One is a 
mini-marketplace of ideas (the one inside the walls of a licensed 
crisis pregnancy center) and the other is a macro-marketplace of 
ideas (the public places and spaces outside the walls of a center). 
Indeed, the majority had no problem with California conveying 
facts about low-cost and free abortion services in the latter 
marketplace.129 As Thomas wrote, California was free to “post the 
information on public property near crisis pregnancy centers.”130 
In other words, the government can meddle and intervene all it 
wants in one marketplace of ideas, but just not in another. The 
majority, however, failed to explicitly articulate such a 
bifurcated-marketplace argument.131 
Turning to the Becerra dissent, which concluded the 
obligation imposed on licensed centers was “likely 
constitutional,”132 Justice Breyer initially criticized the majority’s 
overarching logic that because California’s law was 
content-based, then strict scrutiny presumptively applied in the 
absence of the four exceptions described earlier.133 Breyer opined 
 
 126. Id.  
 127. Id.  
 128. Id.  
 129. See id. at 2376 (majority opinion) (suggesting that California could 
have conveyed information about public funding for abortion services via a 
“public-information campaign”). 
 130. Id. 
 131. See id. at 2374–76 (discussing the importance of maintaining a free and 
uninhibited marketplace of ideas but failing to distinguish between the public 
marketplace and the marketplace inside a licensed pregnancy center). 
 132. Id. at 2379 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 133. See supra notes 109–112 and accompanying text (describing the four 
exceptions). 
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that this methodology—what he dubbed a “general broad 
‘content-based’ test”134—for determining scrutiny 
threatens to create serious problems. Because much, perhaps 
most, human behavior takes place through speech and because 
much, perhaps most, law regulates that speech in terms of its 
content, the majority’s approach at the least threatens 
considerable litigation over the constitutional validity of much, 
perhaps most, government regulation. Virtually every 
disclosure law could be considered “content based,” for 
virtually every disclosure law requires individuals “to speak a 
particular message.”135 
This analysis partly reflects Breyer’s long-standing rejection 
of both a rigid, categorical approach to levels of scrutiny136 and a 
First Amendment “jurisprudence of labels.”137 Furthermore, it 
suggests his fondness for a more fluid balancing and 
proportionality tack.138 It also is indicative of Breyer’s belief that 
conduct—or “human behavior,”139 as he put it in Becerra—and 
speech are often so intertwined that distinguishing between them 
when it comes to determining scrutiny is injudicious.140 But 
 
 134. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2381 
(2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 135. See id. at 2380 (quoting Justice Thomas’s majority opinion). 
 136. See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2234 (2015) (Breyer, 
J., concurring) 
The First Amendment requires greater judicial sensitivity both to the 
Amendment’s expressive objectives and to the public’s legitimate 
need for regulation than a simple recitation of categories, such as 
“content discrimination” and “strict scrutiny,” would permit. In my 
view, the category “content discrimination” is better considered in 
many contexts, including here, as a rule of thumb, rather than as an 
automatic “strict scrutiny” trigger, leading to almost certain legal 
condemnation. 
 137. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 484 (2009) (Breyer, 
J., concurring) (advocating for a purpose-based approach to the categorization of 
speech, rather than rigid adherence to forum-based labels). 
 138. See Donald L. Beschle, No More Tiers? Proportionality as an Alternative 
to Multiple Levels of Scrutiny in Individual Rights Cases, 38 PACE L. REV. 384, 
419 (2018) (observing that Breyer “has shown some enthusiasm for 
proportionality analysis in his separate opinions”); see also Jamal Greene, The 
Supreme Court 2017 Term: Foreword—Rights as Trumps? 132 HARV. L. REV. 28, 
55 (2018) (“Proportionality and balancing approaches to rights have long found 
favor with Justice Breyer.”).  
 139. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2380 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 140. For example, Justice Breyer wrote in 2017 that “virtually all 
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Becerra, unlike Reed v. Town of Gilbert,141 Expressions Hair 
Design v. Schneiderman142 and Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,143 gave 
Breyer his first opportunity to put those beliefs into practice in a 
compelled-speech context. 
Thus, Breyer unsurprisingly sounded an alarm in Becerra: If 
the majority’s position takes hold—that in the absence of an 
exception, strict scrutiny applies to content-based, 
compelled-speech mandates—it “could radically change prior law, 
perhaps placing much securities law or consumer protection law 
at constitutional risk, depending on how broadly its exceptions 
are interpreted.”144 He fretted that the majority’s tack to 
determining scrutiny might open the metaphorical floodgates of 
litigation145 by providing a battering ram (i.e., strict scrutiny) to 
attack “ordinary social and economic regulation”146 and “the mine 
run of disclosure requirements.”147 
 
government regulation affects speech. Human relations take place through 
speech.” Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1152 (2017) 
(Breyer, J., concurring). He thus contended that “it is often wiser not to try to 
distinguish between ‘speech’ and ‘conduct.’” Id.  
 141. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (providing Breyer’s relevant 
sentiment in Reed). 
 142. See supra note 140 and accompanying text (providing Breyer’s relevant 
sentiment in Schneiderman). 
 143. 564 U.S. 552 (2011). Foreshadowing his dissent in Becerra, Justice 
Breyer in Sorrell criticized the notion that strict scrutiny reflexively applies 
when a statute is content-based, opining that: 
To apply a strict First Amendment standard virtually as a matter of 
course when a court reviews ordinary economic regulatory programs 
(even if that program has a modest impact upon a firm’s ability to 
shape a commercial message) would work at cross-purposes with this 
more basic constitutional approach. Since ordinary regulatory 
programs can affect speech, particularly commercial speech, in 
myriad ways, to apply a “heightened” First Amendment standard of 
review whenever such a program burdens speech would transfer from 
legislatures to judges the primary power to weigh ends and to choose 
means, threatening to distort or undermine legitimate legislative 
objectives. 
Id. at 584–85 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 144. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2380 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 145. See id. at 2381 (asserting that the majority’s content-based test issues 
an “invitation to litigation”).  
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
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Breyer suggested that the majority’s decision to constrict the 
deferential Zauderer rule—an exception to strict scrutiny—only 
to cases where “disclosures related to the professional’s own 
services or conduct”148 was misguided because “[m]any ordinary 
disclosure laws”149 do not fit this scenario and thus would 
confront strict scrutiny review. As an example, he cited a 
California statute “requiring hospitals to tell parents about child 
seat belts.”150  
Additionally, Breyer blasted Thomas’s cursorily tossed-out 
effort in Becerra to articulate two other exceptions, each noted 
earlier, to the general rule that strict scrutiny applies in 
content-based, compelled-speech cases.151 Thomas offered those 
exceptions when he explained that “we do not question the 
legality of health and safety warnings long considered 
permissible, or purely factual and uncontroversial disclosures 
about commercial products.”152 
Breyer derisively dubbed this a “generally phrased 
disclaimer.”153 Beyond the difficulties with it addressed earlier, 
Breyer contended Thomas’s attempt to carve out two more 
exceptions from heightened review was “more likely to invite 
litigation than to provide needed limitation and clarification. The 
majority, for example, does not explain why the Act here, which is 
justified in part by health and safety considerations, does not fall 
 
 148. Id. at 2380. Justice Thomas explained for the Becerra majority that 
Zauderer was inapplicable because “[t]he notice in no way relates to the services 
that licensed clinics provide. Instead, it requires these clinics to disclose 
information about state-sponsored services—including abortion, anything but an 
‘uncontroversial’ topic. Accordingly, Zauderer has no application here.” See id. at 
2372 (majority opinion) (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 
U.S. 626, 651 (1985)); see supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text (describing 
how the Becerra majority rejected Zauderer’s application to the facts in Becerra). 
 149. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2380 
(2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 150. See id. (citing CAL. VEH. CODE § 27363.5 (a) (West 2013) (requiring 
hospitals and birthing centers to “provide to and discuss with the parents or the 
person to whom the child is released, if the child is under eight years of age, 
information on the current law requiring child passenger restraint systems, 
safety belts, and the transportation of children in rear seats”)). 
 151. See supra notes 103–104 and accompanying text (identifying these 
exceptions articulated by Justice Thomas). 
 152. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2376 (majority opinion). 
 153. Id. at 2381 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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within its ‘health’ category.”154 He also attacked the “absence of a 
reasoned explanation of the disclaimer’s meaning and 
rationale.”155 
So, if the Becerra majority’s approach to fathoming the 
correct level of scrutiny in a compelled-speech case was wrong, 
then what did Breyer and the dissent suggest was a better 
methodology? Rather than presume that strict scrutiny applies 
solely because a law is content-based, Breyer reasoned that the 
Court should deferentially adopt a “respectful approach to 
economic and social legislation when a First Amendment claim 
like the claim present here is at issue.”156 
More specifically, in the context of compelled-disclosure cases 
involving health issues, Breyer suggested the default standard of 
scrutiny should be akin to rational basis review157 and focus on 
the reasonableness of legislative action.158 He cited Zauderer to 
support this proposition.159 Breyer pointed out that the Court 
there “refused to apply heightened scrutiny.”160 He also argued 
that Zauderer was “not so limited,”161 as the Becerra majority 
claimed, to only cases involving services provided directly by the 
speaker.162 
This marks a critical difference from the Becerra majority’s 
approach to scrutiny, because “[w]hile presumptive validity 
attaches to rational-basis review, a presumption of 
unconstitutionality attends any form of heightened  
 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 2382. 
 157. See supra note 57 (providing an overview of rational basis review). 
 158. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2381–82 (outlining the Court’s historically 
deferential approach to evaluating social regulation that relied on the 
reasonableness of the legislative action to determine whether any speech 
compelled by the regulation violated the Constitution). 
 159. See id. at 2382 (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 
U.S. 626, 651 (1985)). 
 160. Id. at 2386–87. 
 161. Id. at 2387.  
 162. See id. (pointing out that the rationale behind protecting commercial 
speech in the first place—namely, to help provide consumers with  
information—was “not in any way tied to advertisements about a professional’s 
own services”).  
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scrutiny—either strict or intermediate.”163 In brief, the majority’s 
application of heightened scrutiny causes a content-based, 
compelled-speech law to become presumptively unconstitutional 
unless one of four exceptions applies.164 Conversely, under the 
dissent’s tack, a content-based, compelled-speech law involving 
the disclosure of purely factual information is presumptively 
constitutional.  
The dissent’s position comports with the notion that the 
rational basis test is “typically applied to review of economic and 
social regulations,”165 at least when “there is no discrimination 
based on a suspect classification or infringement of a 
fundamental right.”166 The First Amendment protection of speech 
is a fundamental right,167 however, so rational basis review 
typically “plays an extremely limited role in free speech cases.”168 
In addition to playing a role in Zauderer, rational basis review 
also applies to free-speech jurisprudence affecting public school 
students.169 
 
 163. Kenneth A. Klukowski, Making Second Amendment Law with First 
Amendment Rules: The Five-Tier Free Speech Framework and Public Forum 
Doctrine in Second Amendment Jurisprudence, 93 NEB. L. REV. 429, 463 (2014) 
(internal citations omitted).   
 164. See supra notes 109–112 and accompanying text (setting forth the 
majority’s four exceptions to the rule that heightened scrutiny presumptively 
applies). 
 165. Nicholas Walter, The Utility of Rational Basis Review, 63 VILL. L. REV. 
79, 79 (2018). 
 166. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rational Basis Test Is Constitutional (and 
Desirable), 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 403 (2016). 
 167. See Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938) (“Freedom of speech and 
freedom of the press, which are protected by the First Amendment from 
infringement by Congress, are among the fundamental personal rights and 
liberties which are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by 
state action.”). 
 168. Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test that Ate Everything: Intermediate 
Scrutiny in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 787 
(2007). 
 169. The Court has concluded that “educators do not offend the First 
Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student 
speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are 
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. 
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). As Dean Erwin Chemerinsky notes, this 
“is the classic phrasing of the rational basis review.” Erwin Chemerinsky, The 
Hazelwooding of the First Amendment: The Deference to Authority, 11 FIRST 
AMEND. L. REV. 291, 294 (2013). 
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Breyer and the dissent contended that Zauderer’s deferential 
test—rather than heightened scrutiny—applies broadly to cases 
that compel only the disclosure of purely factual, 
noncontroversial information and that do not force a speaker to 
convey or adopt a state-sponsored position or opinion on politics, 
religion, or the nation.170 In the dissent’s view, this standard is 
appropriate because the entire rationale for protecting the speech 
of professionals in commercial settings is to help consumers 
better understand things and make informed choices.171 Put 
differently, the audience’s interest in receiving facts is maximal 
while the speaker’s interest in not conveying them is minimal.172 
In summary, the Becerra majority and dissent took radically 
different approaches for determining the applicable level of 
scrutiny in compelled-disclosure cases and, in doing so, reached 
drastically different results. The majority’s formulaic tack started 
by considering whether the law was content-based or  
content-neutral.173 After deeming it content-based,174 the majority 
then concluded heightened scrutiny should apply unless the case 
fit within one of four exceptions.175 Because it did not fall within 
 
 170. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 
2387 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[W]here a State’s requirement to speak 
‘purely factual and uncontroversial information’ does not attempt to ‘prescribe 
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of 
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein,’ it does not 
warrant heightened scrutiny.” (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985))). 
 171. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (observing that “the extension of First 
Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified principally by the value 
to consumers of the information such speech provides”). 
 172. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2387 (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
Whether the context is advertising the professional’s own services or 
other commercial speech, a doctor’s First Amendment interest in not 
providing factual information to patients is the same: minimal, 
because his professional speech is protected precisely because of its 
informational value to patients. There is no reason to subject such 
laws to heightened scrutiny. 
 173. See id. at 2371 (majority opinion) (discussing how content-based 
regulations, unlike neutral regulations, target speech based on “communicative 
content”). 
 174. See id. (“The licensed notice is a content-based regulation of speech.”). 
 175. See supra notes 109–112 and accompanying text (setting forth the 
majority’s four exceptions to the rule that heightened scrutiny presumptively 
applies). 
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those exceptions (including the majority’s constricted view of 
Zauderer), strict scrutiny presumptively applied to the 
compelled-disclosure mandate at licensed centers.176 Adding 
insult to injury, the majority held that the mandate could not 
pass muster even under intermediate scrutiny, a lesser standard 
of heightened review.177 
The dissent rejected this approach.178 Its test for determining 
if heightened scrutiny applies does not pivot on whether a 
compelled-speech obligation is content-based.179 Instead, it 
assumes the obligation is content-based.180 The dissent then asks 
whether the compelled message involves “purely factual and 
uncontroversial information”181 or, instead, whether it 
“prescribe[s] what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, 
religion, or other matters of opinion or force[s] citizens to confess 
by word or act their faith therein.”182   
If the compelled message consists only of the former speech, 
then “it does not warrant heightened scrutiny.”183 The 
government only needs to prove that the message, per Zauderer, 
is “reasonably related to the State’s interest.”184 If it involves the 
latter, then presumably heightened scrutiny applies.185 The 
 
 176. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2371 (referring to strict scrutiny as a 
“stringent standard”). 
 177. See id. at 2375 (explaining that California’s licensed notice cannot even 
survive intermediate scrutiny because the notice is “not sufficiently drawn to 
achieve” the state’s asserted interest of providing low-income women with 
information about state-sponsored services).  
 178. See id. at 2380 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (warning that the majority’s 
focus on whether or not speech is content-based “threatens to cause serious 
problems” as it “threatens considerable litigation over the constitutional validity 
of much, perhaps most, government regulation”). 
 179. See id. at 2381 (expressing the view that “[p]recedent does not require a 
test such as the majority’s”).  
 180. See id. at 2380 (noting that “[v]irtually every disclosure law could be 
considered ‘content-based’”).   
 181. See id. at 2387 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 182. See id. (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 
642 (1943)). 
 183. Id.  
 184. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) 
(holding that an advertiser’s rights are protected “as long as disclosure 
requirements are reasonably related to the [s]tate’s interest in preventing 
deception of consumers”). 
 185. Id. 
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dissent concluded that the compelled-speech mandate for licensed 
crisis pregnancy centers about the costs of abortion services fell 
into the former category because “the availability of state 
resources is not a normative statement or a fact of debatable 
truth.”186 The dissent, in turn, considered the speech to be “likely 
constitutional.”187 
With these profoundly divergent approaches to scrutiny in a 
compelled-speech case—specifically, a compelled-disclosure-of-
facts case—in mind, the Article next turns to another 2018 
Supreme Court decision involving compelled expression, but in a 
very different context. While the circumstances in the next case, 
Janus v. American Federation of State, County, & Municipal 
Employees, Council 31, are distinct from Becerra, the split over 
scrutiny and the alignment of the Justices is remarkably 
consistent. 
B. Janus v. American Federation of State, County, & Municipal 
Employees, Council 31 
As far as compelled-speech cases go, Janus differs from 
Becerra in at least three key ways: First, Janus is a two-step 
compelled-speech case because the law at issue only compelled a 
monetary contribution, not a direct message.188 The monetary 
contribution, in turn, would be used to support the speech of the 
labor union to which it was made.189 Put differently, Janus is a 
compelled-subsidy-of-speech case.  
Second, Janus did not involve a government-drafted message 
that had to be conveyed, as was the case in Becerra.190 The law, in 
 
 186. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2388 
(2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 187. Id. at 2379. 
 188. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. 
Ct. 2448, 2460 (2018) (noting that under the Illinois statute in question, a 
non-union member who is a public employee must “pay what is generally called 
an ‘agency fee,’ which amounts to a percentage of the union dues”). 
 189. See id. (explaining that the money would “subsidize private speech on 
matters of substantial public concern”). 
 190. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2377 (describing California’s unlicensed 
notice as imposing “government-scripted, speaker-based disclosure 
requirement[s] wholly disconnected from California’s informational interest”). 
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other words, did not require labor unions to follow a script 
penned and approved by Illinois lawmakers.191 In brief, labor 
unions did not need to hew to a specific text in using the  
money—they only had to use the money to support collective 
bargaining activities on behalf of the people who were compelled 
to pay it.192   
A third distinction from Becerra is that Janus was not a 
compelled-disclosure case.193 Janus was not about enhancing 
citizens’ knowledge of their rights to access a state-sponsored 
program, as was the interest that animated California lawmakers 
in Becerra.194 Rather, Janus involved bolstering a union’s ability 
to speak on behalf of its own members and the non-union 
employees it was required to represent during bargaining.195 
Should these differences affect the level of scrutiny to which 
the compelled-speech laws at issue in Becerra and Janus were 
subjected? That normative question is now especially important 
because, ultimately, the conservative majority in  
Janus—precisely as it had done in Becerra—put the law under 
the scalpel of heightened scrutiny.196 And, as was the case in 
 
 191. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2461 (describing how the statute merely 
directed the union to “provide nonmembers with ‘an adequate explanation of the 
basis for the [agency] fee’”). 
 192. Per the Illinois statute at issue in Janus, agency fees were chargeable 
to non-union members for union activities including “the costs of the collective 
bargaining process, contract administration and pursuing matters affecting 
wages, hours and conditions of employment.” 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/6 (e) (2018).  
 193. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2463–64 (explaining how compelled disclosure 
“forc[es] free and independent individuals to endorse ideas they find 
objectionable”). 
 194. See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text (addressing the 
legislative intent behind California’s compelled-speech mandate at licensed 
crisis pregnancy centers). 
 195. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2460 (detailing how unions become employees’ 
designated representative, regardless of whether or not the employees choose to 
become members). 
 196. Justice Samuel Alito, writing for the majority in Janus, noted that the 
dissent “proposes that we apply what amounts to rational-basis review.” Janus, 
138 S. Ct. at 2465. Alito bluntly rebuffed that tack, reasoning that “[t]his form of 
minimal scrutiny is foreign to our free-speech jurisprudence, and we reject it 
here.” Id. The majority instead applied the heightened standard of review 
known as exacting scrutiny, which it called “a less demanding test” than strict 
scrutiny. Id. In justifying the application of a heightened standard of review, 
Alito explained that “because the compelled subsidization of private speech 
seriously impinges on First Amendment rights, it cannot be casually allowed.” 
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Becerra, the four-Justice, liberal-bloc dissent adopted a relaxed, 
deferential level of review in Janus.197 In a nutshell, two very 
different compelled-speech cases were treated in a similarly 
fractured fashion.198 
Why did the majority in Janus apply heightened scrutiny? 
Its discussion of compelled speech sheds much light on that 
question. Furthermore, coming just one day after the split 
decision was handed down in Becerra,199 the Janus decision 
illustrates why compelled speech is a doctrine in disarray. 
Before delving into the majority’s analysis, however, a brief 
review of the facts is essential. Mark Janus, an Illinois public 
employee who was not a union member, objected to being forced 
by state law to pay an agency fee to support the collective 
bargaining activities of the union designated to exclusively 
represent him, the American Federation of State, County, and 
Municipal Employees, Council 31 (“AFSCME”).200 Under Illinois 
 
Id. at 2464. See generally R. George Wright, A Hard Look at Exacting Scrutiny, 
85 UMKC L. REV. 207 (2016) (providing an overview and critique of the exacting 
scrutiny test). 
 197. Writing for the Janus dissenters, Justice Elena Kagan explained that 
when the government, acting as an employer, regulates an employee’s 
expression related to “the terms and conditions of employment,” the Court 
should treat the government’s decisions with “respect—even solicitude.” Janus, 
138 S. Ct. at 2493 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Under this approach, “the government 
really cannot lose” because “managerial interests are obvious and strong. And so 
government employees are . . . just employees, even though they work for the 
government.” Id. The Court thus should have applied what Kagan called its 
“usual deferential approach” akin to the test articulated in Pickering v. Board of 
Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). Id. As Kagan interpreted that test, if the 
regulated “speech is about and directed to the workplace—as contrasted with 
the broader public square,” such as “speech about the terms and conditions of 
employment—the essential stuff of collective bargaining,” then the government 
wins. Id. at 2495. More bluntly, she added that “[i]f an employee’s speech is 
about, in, and directed to the workplace, she has no ‘possibility of a First 
Amendment claim.’” See id. at 2496 (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 
418 (2006)). 
 198. Justice Thomas wrote for the Becerra majority joined by Justices 
Kennedy, Roberts, and Alito with Justice Gorsuch concurring. The dissenting 
opinion was written by Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsberg, Sotomayor, 
and Kagan. Likewise, Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Janus majority, 
joined by Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Roberts, and Gorsuch.   
 199. Becerra was decided on June 26, 2018, while Janus was decided on 
June 27, 2018. 
 200. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 
2448, 2461–62 (2018). The AFSCME describes itself as 
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law, Janus was not required to join a union, but the union 
selected by his co-workers to represent their unit nonetheless was 
assigned to serve as Janus’s sole representative in collective 
bargaining with the government of Illinois.201 The agency  
fee—more favorably referred to by the Janus dissent as a 
“fair-share payment”202—constitutes “a percentage of the union 
dues”203 and is designated by statute to cover only “the costs of 
the collective bargaining process, contract administration and 
pursuing matters affecting wages, hours and conditions of 
employment.”204 Mark Janus’s agency payment was forbidden by 
law from being used by his union to cover costs “related to the 
election or support of any candidate for political office.”205 
Janus objected to the positions that the AFSCME took during 
collective bargaining.206 He believed the union’s stances were 
unwise given the fiscal crisis facing Illinois.207 Janus therefore 
alleged the agency fees were tantamount to “coerced political 
speech.”208  
 
the nation’s largest and fastest growing public services employees 
union. AFSCME’s members provide the vital services that make 
America happen. We are nurses, corrections officers, child care 
providers, EMTs, sanitation workers and more. With working 
members in hundreds of different occupations and retirees across the 
country, AFSCME advocates for fairness in the workplace, excellence 
in public services and prosperity and opportunity for all working 
families.  
About AFSCME, AFSCME, https://perma.cc/MM3C-FG6B (last visited Sept. 23, 
2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 201. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2460 (describing that unions become a unit’s 
sole representative, regardless of whether or not each employee in the unit 
chooses to personally become a member). 
 202. Id. at 2487 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 203. Id. at 2460. 
 204.  5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/ 6(e) (2018). 
 205. Id. § 315/3 (g). 
 206. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2461 (explaining that Mr. Janus opposes 
several of the public policy positions that the union advocates, including the 
union’s positions on collective bargaining). 
 207. See id. (“[M]ark Janus believes that the Union’s ‘behavior in bargaining 
does not appreciate the current fiscal crises in Illinois and does not reflect his 
best interests or the interests of Illinois citizens.’”). 
 208. Id. at 2462.  
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Janus’s framing209 of the substance of his expression was 
strategic because political speech lies at the heart of the First 
Amendment’s protection of free expression.210 Additionally, 
linking speech during collective bargaining to a larger financial 
predicament of a government entity was savvy because it 
suggested the union’s speech constitutes a matter of public 
concern.211 The Supreme Court has made it plain that such 
expression is privileged in First Amendment jurisprudence.212 For 
example, the Court shielded the speech of Westboro Baptist 
Church members from tort claims in Snyder v. Phelps213 because 
“[their] speech was at a public place on a matter of public 
concern,” and thus, “that speech [was] entitled to ‘special 
protection’ under the First Amendment.”214 
Mark Janus’s framing of a public-sector union’s speech 
during collective bargaining with a government entity as 
constituting political expression and a matter of public concern 
clearly paid off with the conservative five-Justice majority on the 
compelled-speech issue.215 To wit, the opening paragraph of the 
 
 209. See Robert M. Entman, Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured 
Paradigm, 43 J. COMM. 51, 52 (1993) (asserting that “[t]o frame is to select some 
aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating 
text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item 
described”). 
 210. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) 
(“[P]olitical speech must prevail against laws that would suppress it, whether by 
design or inadvertence. Laws that burden political speech are ‘subject to strict 
scrutiny,’ which requires the Government to prove that the restriction ‘furthers 
a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.’” (quoting 
Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007))); see 
also McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995) (“When a law 
burdens core political speech, we apply ‘exacting scrutiny,’ and we uphold the 
restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest.”). 
 211. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. 
Ct. 2448, 2477 (2018) (discussing how disagreement between the government 
and the unions about solutions to Illinois’s budget crisis is speech 
“overwhelmingly of substantial public concern”). 
 212. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451–52 (2011) (emphasizing 
that speech on matters of public concern is “at the heart” of the First 
Amendment’s protection). 
 213.  562 U.S. 443 (2011). 
 214.  Id. at 458. 
 215.  See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2475 (“To suggest that speech on such matters 
is not of great public concern . . . is to deny reality.”). 
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majority’s opinion went so far as to characterize the AFSCME’s 
speech as addressing “matters of substantial public concern.”216 
In reaching this characterization, the majority tracked Mark 
Janus’s framing. It latched on to Illinois’s financial woes217 and 
concentrated on the notion that both “how public money is 
spent”218 and the views that unions express on the issues of 
“education, child welfare, healthcare, and minority rights”219 
during collective bargaining are of “great public importance.”220 
This classification of speech during collective bargaining 
between unions and government entities provided an ideal entrée 
for Justice Samuel Alito, in penning the majority opinion, to 
suggest that the compelled-speech obligation in Janus was of 
grave First Amendment concern.221 It was not, in other words, a 
compelled-disclosure case involving purely factual information.222 
Alito thus cited for support canonical compelled-speech cases 
noted in this Article’s Introduction, including Wooley, Barnette 
and Tornillo.223 In doing so, he reasoned that laws “compelling 
speech are at least as threatening”224 as those stopping 
individuals from speaking. Here, he focused specifically on 
statutes that would compel individuals to: 
 
 216.  Id. at 2460 (emphasis added).  
 217.  See id. at 2474–75 (acknowledging that Illinois “suffers from severe 
budget problems” and that the Governor and public-sector unions “disagree 
sharply about what to do about these problems”). 
 218.  Id. at 2475. 
 219.  Id. 
 220.  Id. 
 221.  See id. at 2476 (explaining that the importance of the topics unions 
cover puts their speech in a category of public concern which the Supreme Court 
has often recognized as occupying “the highest rung of the hierarchy of First 
Amendment values”). 
 222. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 
(1985) (concluding that the state was regulating only “purely factual and 
uncontroversial information” related to the calculation of contingent-fee rates as 
opposed to “prescib[ing] what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, 
or other matters of opinion or forc[ing] citizens to confess by word or act their 
faith therein”). 
 223. See cases cited supra notes 7–17 and accompanying text (providing a 
brief overview of each case). 
 224. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 
2448, 2464 (2018). 
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 • “mouth support for views they find objectionable;”225  
 • “voice ideas with which they disagree;”226 and  
 • “express[] support for a particular set of positions on 
 controversial public issues.”227 
 In brief, Alito pounded home the point that because Janus 
was an expression-of-viewpoint mandate, this justified ratcheting 
up the level of scrutiny because “additional damage is done” 
beyond that which occurs when the government silences 
someone.228 He explained that “[f]orcing free and independent 
individuals to endorse ideas they find objectionable is always 
demeaning,”229 and added that “[c]ompelling a person to subsidize 
the speech of other private speakers raises similar First 
Amendment concerns.”230   
Laws like that in Illinois therefore “cannot be casually 
allowed”231 and heightened scrutiny must be applied, at least in 
the majority’s view.232 A general rule for scrutiny in 
compelled-speech cases for the Janus majority thus appears to be 
this: If a statute, either directly or through a 
funding-subsidization mandate, compels a person to express a 
viewpoint she disagrees with on an issue of public concern, then 
heightened scrutiny applies.  
It may be that the Janus dissent also embraces such a 
general rule, but that it vehemently disagrees with the majority 
that speech during collective bargaining with the government is a 
matter of public concern.233 Justice Elena Kagan, authoring a 
dissent joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, 
 
 225. Id. at 2463. 
 226. Id. at 2464. 
 227. Id.  
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id.  
 231. Id. 
 232. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (explaining the majority’s 
decision to apply exacting scrutiny). 
 233. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2496 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (observing that the 
Court has previously “rejected all attempts by employees to make a ‘federal 
constitutional issue’ out of basic employment matters” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
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and Sonia Sotomayor, concluded that such expression is decidedly 
not a matter of public concern because it is “about the terms of 
employment: The workplace remains both the context and the 
subject matter of the expression.”234 An alternative, more narrow 
and context-specific way of phrasing the dissent’s position may be 
this: If speech is compelled in the context of collective bargaining 
sessions between a union representing public-sector employees 
and the government, then a standard of scrutiny approximating 
rational basis review—not any form of heightened First 
Amendment scrutiny—is appropriate.235 
 Viewed at a macro level, at least for the Janus majority and 
from a decidedly pro-First Amendment perspective, being 
compelled to subsidize the speech of public-sector unions during 
collective bargaining is equally as wrong as being compelled to 
pledge allegiance to the United States or to salute the American 
flag (Barnette)236 or being mandated to publicly display a state 
motto that conflicts with one’s religious beliefs (Wooley).237 Janus, 
in brief, fits snugly with the framework of these seminal cases. 
The four-Justice dissent, however, flatly rejected such 
equivalency and offered a very different view of the compelled 
speech in Janus.238 Specifically, Justice Kagan rebuked the 
majority’s reliance on Barnette for the sweeping proposition that 
“compelling speech always works a greater injury, and so always 
requires a greater justification.”239 She suggested that Barnette 
was an outlier case, calling it “possibly (thankfully) the most 
exceptional in our First Amendment annals.”240   
 
 234. Id. 
 235. See id. at 2494 (advocating for the “usual deferential approach” first 
articulated in Pickering v. Board of Education, 205, 391 U.S. 563 (1968)). 
 236. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) 
(concluding that a forced pledge of allegiance “invades the sphere of intellect 
and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment” to protect). 
 237. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (deciding that New 
Hampshire was not allowed to force citizens to become “mobile billboard[s]” for 
the state’s “ideological message[s]”). 
 238. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. 
Ct. 2448, 2494 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[I]f anything, the First 
Amendment scales tip the opposite way when (as here) the government is not 
compelling actual speech, but instead compelling a subsidy that others will use 
for expression.”). 
  239.  Id. (emphasis added).  
  240.  Id.  
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Therefore, rather than viewing compelled-speech regulations 
as presumptively more dangerous than ones silencing expression, 
Kagan considered them of equal constitutional concern.241 
Furthermore, she opined that when a case does not directly 
compel speech but, as in Janus, involves the compelled 
subsidization of speech, then it actually is of less worry than a 
statute squelching speech.242 In the dissent’s view, when the 
“government mandates a speech subsidy from a public 
employee . . . it should get at least as much deference as when it 
restricts the employee’s speech.”243 
In summary, Janus raises key questions about the future of 
compelled-speech jurisprudence: First and foremost, should 
compelled-speech laws be viewed as presumptively more 
dangerous than laws that stop speech, or should they be treated 
as of equal concern? As suggested above, the majority and dissent 
are fractured on this issue.244  
Second and relatedly, is it possible to limit the reach of 
Justice Alito’s assertion that “additional damage is done”245 when 
speech is compelled to only situations where the speech being 
compelled constitutes a viewpoint on an issue of public concern? 
This limitation may be the case because Alito’s two sentences 
immediately following his additional damage contention read: 
In that situation, individuals are coerced into betraying their 
convictions. Forcing free and independent individuals to 
endorse ideas they find objectionable is always demeaning, and 
for this reason, one of our landmark free speech cases said that 
a law commanding “involuntary affirmation” of objected-to 
 
  241.  See id. (noting that “the standard First Amendment rule is that the 
‘difference between compelled speech and compelled silence’ is ‘without 
constitutional significance’” (quoting Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 
781, 796 (1988))). 
 242. See id. (opining that “the majority’s distinction between compelling and 
restricting speech . . . lacks force” and insisting that the right to speak and the 
right to refrain from speaking are “complimentary components” of the First 
Amendment (quoting Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714)). 
 243. Id. at 2495. 
 244. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (setting forth the majority’s 
position) and note 197 and accompanying text (setting forth the dissent’s 
position). 
 245. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2464 (majority opinion). 
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beliefs would require “even more immediate and urgent 
grounds” than a law demanding silence.246 
In other words, might it be that Alito’s worry that 
compelled-speech laws cause more harm does not apply in 
scenarios factually distinct from Janus, such as cases involving 
only the compelled disclosure of objective facts like Becerra? Yet 
even this effort to give Alito’s words a constrained reach is 
muddled because the Becerra majority, in fact, applied 
heightened First Amendment scrutiny in a 
compelled-disclosure-of-factual information case.247 
 A third concern is that even if the majority and dissent were 
to agree that heightened First Amendment scrutiny applies when 
the government compels a person to express an ideological 
viewpoint on a matter of public concern, the two sides in Janus 
could not agree on what constitutes a matter of public concern.248 
The majority found that speech during collective bargaining 
sessions between a union and the government is a matter of 
public concern and importance.249 The dissent strenuously 
disagreed.250 In other words, even if a legal standard is agreed 
upon in certain compelled-speech scenarios, that standard is 
tremendously problematic if it hinges on whether speech is a 
matter of public concern because “the line delineating the public 
and private provinces is anything but bright,”251 thereby affording 
 
 246. See id. (emphasis added) (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1943)). 
 247. See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text (describing how the 
Becerra majority concluded that the regulation imposed on licensed crisis 
pregnancy centers failed to pass muster under the heightened standard of 
review known as intermediate scrutiny). 
 248. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2495 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The question is 
not, as the majority seems to think, whether the public is, or should be, 
interested in a government employee’s speech. Instead, the question is whether 
that speech is about and directed to the workplace . . . .”). 
 249. See id. at 2473 (majority opinion) (“When a large number of employees 
speak through their union, the category of speech that is of public concern is 
greatly enlarged, and the category of speech that is of only private concern is 
substantially shrunk.”). 
 250. See id. at 2496 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (distinguishing speech that is of 
public concern with speech that is “about, in, and directed to the workplace”). 
    251. Clay Calvert, Defining “Public Concern” After Snyder v. Phelps: A 
Pliable Standard Mingles with News Media Complicity, 19 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. 
L.J. 39, 40 (2012). 
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ample legal leeway for the conservative and liberal Justices to 
reach contrary positions on what is of public concern. The split in 
Janus makes this abundantly clear. 
Ultimately, the majority and dissent were thousands of legal 
miles apart in their approach to the compelled-speech scenario 
they confronted in Janus. While the dissent characterized the 
Illinois statute as a mere “workaday economic and regulatory 
policy,”252 the majority held that it “seriously impinges on First 
Amendment rights”253 and thus “cannot be casually allowed.”254 
Such framing, in turn, led them to apply different standards of 
scrutiny and to reach different outcomes. 
III. Digging Deeper into Justice Thomas’s Views on Compelled 
Speech: His Masterpiece Cakeshop Concurrence 
As noted earlier, Justice Thomas authored the majority 
opinion in Becerra.255 Just a few weeks earlier, in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, Thomas 
elaborated on his views about compelled speech in a concurrence 
joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch.256 Although the Court resolved 
the case on freedom of religion grounds that avoided the free 
speech question,257 a brief examination of Thomas’s Masterpiece 
Cakeshop concurrence sheds additional light on his and Gorsuch’s 
views about compelled speech.  
Thomas suggested in Masterpiece Cakeshop that it makes no 
difference in compelled-speech cases whether the government is: 
1) compelling expression of an opinion or a fact,258 or 2) 
 
   252. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 
2448, 2501 (2018)  (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 253. Id. at 2464 (majority opinion). 
 254. Id. 
 255. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (identifying the five-Justice 
Becerra majority). 
 256.  Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 
1719, 1740 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring in part). 
 257. See id. at 1724 (majority opinion) (“[T]he Commission’s actions here 
violated the Free Exercise Clause; and its order must be set aside.”). 
 258. See id. at 1742 (Thomas, J., concurring in part) (opining that the First 
Amendment “applies not only to expressions of value, opinion, or endorsement, 
but equally to statements of fact the speaker would rather avoid” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
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compelling the “creation, distribution or consumption of the 
speech.”259 In other words, as to the first facet, it seems Thomas 
would examine a compelled factual disclosure law under the same 
level of scrutiny as a law compelling expression of a political 
opinion.260  
Additionally, he made it clear that Colorado’s public 
accommodation law compelling Jack Phillips to bake a cake that 
celebrated a same-sex marriage could only pass muster if it 
survived strict scrutiny.261 In brief, because Thomas believes that 
“the government cannot compel speech,”262 any mandate to the 
contrary must survive the Court’s highest level of review. This 
proved to be the case for Thomas in Becerra regarding the 
compelled-disclosure law for licensed crisis pregnancy centers, 
although he held there that it was not necessary to apply strict 
scrutiny because the law failed review under intermediate 
scrutiny.263 
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, Thomas reasoned that the Colorado 
law could not pass muster under strict scrutiny because it was 
designed to prevent individuals such as Phillips from expressing 
views that might offend others.264 Citing the Court’s ruling in the 
flag-burning case of Texas v. Johnson,265 Thomas explained that 
“[s]tates cannot punish protected speech because some group 
 
 259. Id.  
 260. See id. at 1745–46 (reasoning that both forms of speech are equally 
expressive, requiring government regulations limiting either form to survive 
strict scrutiny). 
 261. See id. (“Because Phillips’ conduct . . . was expressive, Colorado’s 
public-accommodations law cannot penalize it unless the law withstands strict 
scrutiny.”). 
 262. Id. at 1745. 
 263. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 
2375 (2018) (concluding that because California’s law did not apply to other 
types of clinics, it was “not sufficiently drawn to achieve” its stated mission and 
therefore could not survive intermediate scrutiny).  
 264. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1746 (Thomas, J., concurring in 
part) (“Colorado would not be punishing Phillips if he refused to create any 
custom wedding cakes; it is punishing him because he refuses to create custom 
wedding cakes that express approval of same-sex marriage. In cases like this 
one, our precedents demand ‘the most exacting scrutiny.’” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
 265. 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). 
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finds it offensive, hurtful, stigmatic, unreasonable, or 
undignified.”266 
Thomas added one other point that merits noting. 
Specifically, he concluded that allowing a person to issue a 
disclaimer disavowing the compelled message or disassociating 
oneself from it does not eliminate the First Amendment free 
speech issues.267 Thomas wrote here that “[t]he Colorado Court of 
Appeals also erred by suggesting that Phillips could simply post a 
disclaimer, disassociating Masterpiece from any support for 
same-sex marriage. Again, this argument would justify any law 
compelling speech. And again, this Court has rejected it.”268 
In brief, Thomas’s concurrence in Masterpiece Cakeshop 
indicates his steadfast unwillingness to give laws that compel 
speech of any form—be it disclosure of facts or expressions of 
opinion—a judicial pass under something less than heightened 
First Amendment scrutiny. The fact that Justice Gorsuch joined 
him in this concurrence suggests the Trump appointee backs up 
Thomas in this position. 
IV. Conclusion 
This Article exposed fervent disagreement between the 
Supreme Court’s conservative and liberal blocs over the relevant 
standard of scrutiny for analyzing compelled-speech statutes in 
two 2018 cases, Becerra and Janus. Of course, if one accepts the 
“realist thesis that there is more to legal decision-making than 
the orderly application of positive law generalizations”269 and 
acknowledges “the fallacy of the logical form as the source for 
answers to legal questions,”270 then it is nearly impossible not to 
contextualize these cases within the broader social and political 
 
 266. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1746 (Thomas, J., concurring in 
part). 
 267. See id. at 1745 (reasoning that the government “cannot ‘require 
speakers to affirm in one breath that which they deny in the next’” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
 268. Id.  
 269. Harry W. Jones, Law and Morality in the Perspective of Legal Realism, 
61 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 799 (1961). 
 270. E. Hunter Taylor, Jr., H. L. A. Hart’s Concept of Law in the Perspective 
of American Legal Realism, 35 MODERN L. REV. 606, 606–07 (1972). 
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frameworks that animate them—abortion271 and labor unions.272 
In other words, it may be that these contentious subjects, which 
some may view as dividing conservatives and liberals, 
exacerbated the scrutiny problems in Becerra and Janus.273 
Perhaps when less polarizing compelled-speech cases come down 
the legal pike, the Court will be less fractured over scrutiny. 
That, however, is speculative.  
What now is certain is that the Court’s conservatives are 
ready to ratchet up scrutiny in compelled-speech cases involving 
both the disclosure of objectively true facts (Becerra) and those 
that ostensibly compel individuals to adopt viewpoints they 
oppose on issues of public concern (Janus). In the process, they 
are willing to: 1) narrowly confine the reach of Zauderer, thereby 
limiting the availability of what amounts to a rational basis 
test,274 and 2) broadly construe, per Janus, what constitutes a 
matter of public concern, thereby increasing the odds that 
heightened scrutiny will apply.275 For the conservatives—and as 
the title of this Article states—Zauderer withers while 
heightened scrutiny blossoms. Moreover, Justice Thomas’s 
concurrence in Masterpiece Cakeshop, which was addressed in 
Part II, only buttresses this stance.  
Conversely, the Court’s liberals want to apply the equivalent 
of rational basis review in compelled-speech cases involving the: 
1) compelled disclosure of only purely factual, uncontroversial 
information (Becerra),276 and 2) compelled-subsidization of 
public-sector union speech where money is expended only on 
expression affecting collective bargaining with the government 
 
 271. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2361. 
 272. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 
2448 (2018). 
 273.  See id. at 2459 (showcasing an ideological split between the 
conservative majority and the liberal dissenters); Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2367 
(same). 
 274. See supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text (addressing the Becerra 
majority’s efforts to limit the scope of the rule from Zauderer). 
 275.  See supra notes 216–219 and accompanying text (addressing the Janus 
majority’s characterization of the speech that occurs during collective 
bargaining between a public-sector union and a governmental entity). 
 276. See supra note 170 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Breyer’s 
view that the compelled-disclosure mandate in Becerra does “not warrant 
heightened scrutiny”). 
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(Janus).277 The first facet reflects a broad interpretation of 
Zauderer, not limiting it to situations involving disclosure of facts 
about goods or services offered directly by the individual or entity 
being compelled to speak.278 The second embraces a deferential 
approach to what Justice Kagan termed “workaday economic and 
regulatory policy.”279 
Given the wide range of contexts in which right-not-to-speak 
claims may arise,280 it is doubtful that a single, one-size-fits-all 
approach for determining scrutiny will be sufficiently nuanced 
and nimble to account for all situations. Simply presuming that if 
a compelled-speech law is content-based, then strict scrutiny 
applies, is a decidedly blunt and sweeping approach. Why? 
Because, as Justice Breyer suggested in Becerra, “much, perhaps 
most, law regulates . . . speech in terms of its content.”281   
On the other hand, presuming that rational basis review 
applies if the Justices frame a case not as about speech, but 
instead as addressing, per the Becerra dissent, “ordinary 
economic and social legislation,”282 or, as the Janus dissent put it, 
“workaday economic and regulatory policy,”283 is also 
troublesome. What one group of Justices might classify as a case 
about economic and social legislation, another might perceive  
it—to use Justice Thomas’s phrase in Becerra—as involving a 
full-scale “speech as speech”284 dispute. 
 
 277. See supra notes 236–241 and accompanying text (summarizing Justice 
Kagan’s argument for applying a more relaxed, deferential standard of review in 
Janus). 
 278. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 
2387 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting)  
The majority concludes that Zauderer does not apply because the 
disclosure ‘in no way relates to the services that licensed clinics 
provide’ . . . . But information about state resources for family 
planning, prenatal care, and abortion is related to the services that 
licensed clinics provide . . . . Regardless, Zauderer is not so limited. 
 279. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 280. See cases cited supra notes 7–19 and accompanying text (discussing 
right-not-to-speak Supreme Court cases in a variety of social, political, and 
religious contexts). 
 281. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2380 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 282. Id. at 2381. 
 283.  Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 
2448, 2501 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 284. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2374 (majority opinion). 
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Therefore, rather than adopting a rather reductionist 
formula for fathoming the correct standard of scrutiny in 
compelled-speech cases, one might articulate multiple criteria or 
variables for courts to consistently and holistically consider 
during the scrutiny determination. Using variants of some of the 
labels noted in Part II, Section A,285 these factors might include 
analysis of: 
1) Whether a law compels a speaker to express or embrace a 
subjective viewpoint with which she disagrees on any given topic 
or, alternatively, whether it compels conveyance of objectively 
true facts that are reasonably related to a speaker’s goods or 
services.286 The former type of compulsion militates in favor of a 
higher level of scrutiny than the latter, per the collective logic of 
Barnette, Wooley, and Zauderer. 
2) Whether the legislative intent of a law is to enhance the 
overall amount of information in the marketplace of ideas that is 
reasonably related to the speaker’s goods or services so that 
recipients of the speech can make better informed choices 
(knowledge-enhancement rationale) or, instead, whether the 
intent is to prevent deception by private speakers that otherwise 
would be reasonably likely to arise in the absence of the 
compelled speech (prevention-of-deception rationale), akin to 
Zauderer’s interest in preventing deception about contingency fee 
arrangements.287 A law premised on the former, 
knowledge-enhancement rationale arguably merits analysis 
under a higher level of scrutiny because the government is not 
merely attempting to thwart deception by private actors but is 
actively intervening to add separate information that it feels is 
essential.288 In other words, the knowledge-enhancement 
justification gives the state power to tilt the marketplace of 
 
 285. See discussion supra Part II.A (providing a brief overview of labels used 
to characterize compelled-speech laws). 
 286. See supra notes 124–128 and accompanying text (discussing the 
“objectively true facts” label). 
 287. See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text (discussing the 
“knowledge-enhancement” and “prevention-of-deception” rationales). 
 288. See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text (suggesting that there is 
a difference between a governmental interest in curbing the spread of false, 
misleading information and an interest in sending its own message to the 
public). 
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ideas—not simply correct it—with information it believes is 
important. 
3) Whether conveyance of the compelled speech significantly 
harms the ability of the speaker to effectively and clearly convey 
a political, moral, or religious belief,289 or alternatively, whether 
it detrimentally affects only the economic and fiscal interests of 
the speaker. This distinction is grounded in the Court’s view that 
it “is wrong to equate the judicial review applicable to the 
regulation of a constitutionally protected personal liberty with 
the less strict review applicable where . . . economic legislation is 
at issue.”290 The former type of compelled-speech mandate should 
require greater scrutiny because it affects a person’s beliefs and 
values, not simply his or her pocketbook. This factor is also 
suggested by Becerra, where the effectiveness of crisis pregnancy 
centers to convey their anti-abortion message and thereby 
influence women to carry a baby to term was arguably 
diminished by having to convey information that abortions were 
available at little to no cost.291 Those financial facts about 
abortions might steer some women toward abortions and away 
from the speaker’s pro-life position. Put differently, this factor 
entails consideration of the message-diluting or 
message-adulterating impact of the compelled-speech 
regulation.292  
4) Whether the compelled-speech regulation is intended to 
bring health and safety benefits for the audience that receives it. 
If that is the legislative intent, the Court must consider actual 
 
 289. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 707 (1977) (involving 
government-mandated license plates that were “repugnant to [some residents’] 
moral and religious beliefs”). 
 290. Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309 (2016). 
 291. See Nat’l Inst. Of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 
2371 (2018)  
[L]icensed clinics must provide a government-drafted script about the 
availability of state-sponsored services, as well as contact information 
for how to obtain them. One of those services is abortion—the very 
practice that petitioners are devoted to opposing. By requiring 
petitioners to inform women how they can obtain state-subsidized 
abortions—at the same time petitioners try to dissuade women from 
choosing that option—the licensed notice plainly “alters the content” 
of petitioners’ speech. 
 292. See supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text (discussing the 
“message-diluting” rationale). 
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evidence suggesting tangible health and safety benefits of the 
legislation like in Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt,293 where 
the Court placed “considerable weight upon evidence and 
argument presented in judicial proceedings”294 regarding the 
alleged health and safety benefits to women of two Texas laws295 
limiting access to abortions. The Court struck down the laws 
partly because they provided “few, if any, health benefits for 
women.”296 In brief, if a health-and-safety argument is made in 
favor of compelling speech, then the Court should apply a level of 
scrutiny that requires examining the evidence that ostensibly 
supports that argument. 
These, of course, are merely preliminary suggestions of 
criteria for judicial use when determining the level of scrutiny in 
compelled-speech cases. They are not meant to be exclusive of 
other variables or factors. Furthermore, they are offered here 
solely as springboards for academic and judicial debate and 
consideration.  
Regardless, however, of whether the Court ignores, rejects, or 
adopts them, it is crucial for the Justices to better define and 
then consistently apply at least some concrete variables for 
deciding the correct level of scrutiny in compelled-speech cases. 
Doing so would add predictability and rigor to this now confusing 
facet of First Amendment jurisprudence that has sprawled since 
Barnette was handed down more than seventy-five years ago.297 
Moreover, it might bolster the Court’s legitimacy298—something 
likely damaged by the contentious confirmation hearings in 2018 
 
 293. 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309 (2016). 
 294.  Id. at 2310. 
 295.  One law required physicians who perform abortions to have admitting 
privileges at a hospital within thirty miles of the facility where they perform 
abortions. Id. at 2300. The second statute required facilities that perform 
abortions to have the same medical equipment necessary to be classified as an 
ambulatory surgical center. Id.  
 296.  Id. at 2298. 
 297.  See supra notes 20–25 and accompanying text (detailing the 
historical—and often confusing—evolution of Supreme Court right-not-to-speak 
jurisprudence). 
 298.  Legitimacy here refers to what Justice Elena Kagan recently described 
as the public perceiving that the Court’s “decision-making has a kind of 
integrity to it” and believing that the Court is “not simply just an extension of 
politics.” Robert Barnes & Carol D. Leonnig, Partisan Mud Could End Up 
Tarnishing High Court’s Halo, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2018, at A8. 
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for Justice Brett Kavanaugh299—that is further sapped when it 
fractures along perceived political lines. Such fracturing, as this 
Article made evident, is precisely what happened in the 
compelled-speech cases of Becerra and Janus,300 leaving the 
Court’s jurisprudence in this realm both disorderly and 
partisanly pliable.  
 
 299.  See, e.g., Megan McArdle, There Is No Cleaning Up This Kavanaugh 
Mess, WASH. POST, OCT. 7, 2018, AT A23 (“Putting Kavanaugh on the Court under 
these circumstances has outraged the left half of the political spectrum and 
undermined the already shaky legitimacy of the Court, and it will touch off a 
political firestorm if Kavanaugh becomes the fifth vote to overturn Roe v. 
Wade.”); Jason L. Riley, Upward Mobility: Democrats Rage Against the 
Judiciary, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2018, at A17 (quoting U.S. Senator Dianne 
Feinstein, a Democrat from California, for the proposition that Brett 
Kavanaugh’s confirmation “undermines the legitimacy of the Supreme Court”). 
 300.  See supra note 273 and accompanying text (noting the glaring partisan 
divide between the majority and the dissent in Becerra and Janus). 
